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The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in
Nineteenth Century America. By Sarah Barringer Gordon. University of
North Carolina Press, 2002. 337 pages. $19.95.
Sarah Barringer Gordon has written a balanced and readable
history. There are, as expected, descriptions of key events in the
development of the Mormon church. We are reminded of the
1
founding of the church by Joseph Smith in 1830. There is a brief
recounting of the tensions that arose between the early Mormons
and their neighbors in certain Midwestern states, culminating in
2
Smith’s murder by an angry mob in 1844. The ensuing migration
to the Great Salt Lake Basin under the leadership of Brigham
Young was followed by the “Mormon Reformation” circa 1857,
during which the doctrine of blood atonement was espoused and

†

Anthony S. Winer is a Professor at William Mitchell College of Law.
SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE M ORMON Q UESTION: POLYGAMY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 19-22 (2002)
(hereinafter “GORDON”).
2. Id. at 24-25 (“In Ohio, Missouri and Illinois, neighbors who initially
welcomed the Mormons soon became their enemies. . . . [B]loc voting, forming a
private militia, and dealing exclusively with approved merchants . . ., combined
with rumors of sexual irregularities, Mormons’ aggressive proselytizing, and their
apparently unquestioning obedience to Smith, made Mormon settlements
unpopular with nearby residents.”).
1.
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Mormon convictions grew more intense. Through it all, Professor
Gordon’s primary emphasis is focused with admirable
concentration on the institution of polygamy, or “plural marriage”
as practiced by the 19th century Mormons.
Professor Gordon’s research is detailed and impeccable. Her
narrative evokes, without succumbing to, the passions raised on all
sides of the various controversies involved. She induces the reader
to experience the emotional reality of much that occurred, while
maintaining a significant degree of even-handedness in her
descriptions.
Still, after having finished reading this excellent narrative, it is
fair for one to ask oneself, “Exactly what is this a history of?”
I. A PARTICULARIZED SCOPE FOR PROFESSOR GORDON’ S NARRATIVE
This is not a general history of Mormon polygamy, or even a
legal or political history of Mormon polygamy. This is because a
key and paramount element of any such history is intentionally left
substantially uncovered. Professor Gordon’s narrative basically
ends with the Supreme Court’s decision in Late Corp. of the Church of
4
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, which upheld the so5
called Edmunds-Tucker Act, directing the federal escheat of
substantially all the property of the Mormon church. The book
briefly mentions, but does not give any substantial attention to, the
6
ensuing events, in which the entering State of Utah “forever
prohibited” the practice of polygamy as a condition for its
7
admission into the union.
3. Id. at 58-59 (“The ‘Reformation’, as it is commonly termed, entailed a
massive (re)commitment by the faithful . . . . Mormon sermons grew hyperbolic,
some even including topics such as the infamous doctrine of ‘blood atonement’
(or the theory that only the shedding of the sinner’s blood could atone for some
sins).”).
4. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
5. Ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
6. After having discussed the first Late Corporation case at length, Gordon
briefly describes the 1890 “Manifesto” issued by Wilford Woodruff, whom she
characterizes as “the last of the Mormon presidents to have made the great
journey with Brigham Young.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 220. According to
Gordon, Woodruff’s statement was a capitulation on the subject of polygamy,
which “assured all concerned that he would no longer advise the faithful to
engage in unlawful practices.” Id. There is no substantial further development of
how this “capitulation” was effectuated, ensuing political developments regarding
the admission of Utah as a state, or the resulting effects on Mormon doctrine.
7. The Act of Congress that enabled the admission of Utah into the union as
a state contained as one of its conditions a requirement that in Utah “polygamous
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A complete political and legal history of Mormon polygamy
would address this ultimate phase of the institution in detail. As
Gordon acknowledges, prior to 1890, there had been many
attempts by the federal authorities and others to expunge polygamy
8
in the Mormon territories, but all had failed. There must have
been factors at work regarding the ultimate renunciation that were
not present in the earlier efforts that caused the capitulation to be
eventually effective. Perhaps there were elements of Mormon life
and culture that facilitated the ultimate renunciation of polygamy
in spite of the pain and disruption that it no doubt caused. These,
9
however, are not treated at length in this narrative.
All this is understandable when one realizes that the intended
scope of this book is somewhat narrower than a complete legal
history of Mormon polygamy.
Instead, Professor Gordon’s
enterprise is more subtle. She includes in the opening paragraphs
of the book a brief description of her focus, but the busy reader
might well pass over it without realizing its significance in
delineating the scope of what is to follow. Professor Gordon states
that her book is “about the efforts of the 18th century participants
in the battle over Mormon polygamy (or plural marriage) to
explain ‘why the practice of polygamy . . . created a constitutional
conflict over the meaning and scope of democracy in the United
10
States.’”
That is, her subject is the legal and political battle of words
and ideas that surrounded the practice of Mormon polygamy, and
in particular the effects of this battle of words on constitutional
doctrine, while the institution of polygamy was in effect. She wants
or plural marriages are forever prohibited.” Utah Enabling Act, Ch. 138, § 3
(First), 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894).
8. Gordon describes various strategies used by polygamous Mormons to
defeat the attempted enforcement of anti-polygamist laws and policies. Chief
among them were the practice of defendants’ going “Underground,” which
(according to Gordon) amounted to massive games of hide-and-seek, in which the
Mormon faithful would assist in secretly sheltering accused polygamists. GORDON,
supra note 1, at 158-59.
Another “defense strategy” was the resort to
“forgetfulness” by witnesses in legal proceedings, particularly Mormon women. Id.
at 161.
9. Gordon discusses isolated factors, such as the controversy that she
describes as involving the seating of Mormon Senator Reed Smoot in 1907, as
contributing to a process in which “Mormon leaders gradually, but with increasing
conviction, internalized an anti-polygamous ethic.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 13637. These are particular incidents, however, rather than part of a comprehensive
overview.
10. GORDON, supra note 1, at 1.
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to focus on the rhetorical and strategic argumentation, abroad in
the land but also specifically in the Supreme Court, through which
the polygamy battle was fought. Her interest is the impact of the
debate on the language and ideas of the Constitution, rather than
the entire legal ramifications of Mormon polygamy per se. This is a
reasonable focus of attention, and it affords several interesting
observations about the development of constitutional doctrine.
For example, lay readers may not be fully familiar with the
predicament of federalism in which the early Saints found
themselves. Professor Gordon reports that while the early
Mormons were still residents largely of the Midwestern states, they
seized on the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause to shield them
from the depredations of hostile state governments. They were
disappointed to learn, however, that at the time the clause was held
only to limit the federal government and not the states. They
learned first-hand the limitations of a federal structure, in which an
oppressed minority could look only to its own local state
11
government for the protection of local civil rights.
Then, upon the migration to the Great Salt Lake Basin, the
early Saints surely felt that they could develop their own local
12
religious culture free from interference.
However, in their
particular local circumstances, they were residents of an as-yet
unincorporated federal territory, rather than a fully sovereign state.
The Constitution is quite explicit that the federal Congress has
13
substantial authority over the governance of federal territories.
Additionally, at the time of the Mormon migration, the
Reconstruction Congresses contained ample quantities of
legislators hostile to the Mormon cause.
As Professor Gordon tells the story, it must have been
especially frustrating for the newly-settled Mormons to learn that
whereas they had earlier been subject to the disfavor of hostile state
governments, constitutional federalism was not to spare them from
11. GORDON, supra note 1, at 8-9 (“Mormons . . . did not have a clear
understanding of state constitutional law. . . . They were amazed and mortified
that the Constitution failed to protect them or to avenge their suffering at the
hands of local populations.”).
12. GORDON, supra note 1, at 9 (“After they fled westward in the late 1840s,
Mormon leaders claimed that the same principles that left them exposed to the
vicissitudes of local majority rule in the states, dictated that they had the same
rights to self-governance in their own jurisdiction - the Territory of Utah.”).
13. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.”).
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a hostile federal Congress even as they attempted to establish their
14
own territory. Later critics would call situations such as this a
15
“double bind.”
Professor Gordon’s work is especially valuable in describing
dynamics such as these. The emphasis on constitutional discourse
permeates much of the book. Indeed, most of the substantive
discussion in the volume addresses one point or another relevant to
two key Supreme Court cases and the statutes they addressed. The
16
later of these two, already referenced, was the Late Corp. of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints case, addressing the
17
constitutionality of the Edmunds-Tucker Act. The earlier was the
18
more broadly famous, Reynolds v. United States, addressing the
19
constitutionality of the Morrill Act, Congress’s first attempt to
20
outlaw polygamy in the Mormon territories.
II. POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS OF A BROADER PERSPECTIVE
As valuable as the particularized focus of the volume is, it has
several shortcomings. The first such shortcoming was suggested
21
earlier, and can be addressed in the terms of Gordon’s own
enterprise. Since the book does not cover the eventual retraction
of polygamy as an institution, no insight is gained concerning
14. GORDON, supra note 1, at 9 (“And yet Utah was a territory, and thus
neither a state nor entirely under federal control. Territories occupied an
ambiguous and changeable place in the legal order, for although they clearly were
not states (yet), they also were presumed to have the power to become states.
Territories were subject to federal organization as political entities. But it was not
clear how much of the states’ power to govern themselves they acquired after
organization but before statehood.”).
15. E.g., EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 58 (1990)
(referencing a literary and cultural tradition that, by incorporating at the same
time elements that are simultaneously homophobic and homoerotic, partakes of a
“double-binding” character).
16. See supra notes at notes 4-5 and accompanying text (briefly describing the
Edmunds-Tucker Act).
17. The Late Corporation case, and the relationship between the 19th century
Mormon church and the ownership and management of property, which the case
chiefly involves, are the primary topics in Chapter 6 of Gordon’s Book, titled “The
Marital Economy.” (GORDON, at 183-220.)
18. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
19. Ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501 (1862).
20. The Reynolds decision is the primary focus of Chapter 4 of Gordon’s book,
titled “Law and Patriarchy at the Supreme Court.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 119-45.
21. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the possibility that
elements of Mormon perspectives might have facilitated the ultimate renunciation
of polygamy).
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whatever changes the retraction might have worked in Mormon
legal and political attitudes. Further, no points are made regarding
any underlying aspects of the earlier Mormon cause that might
have presaged or facilitated the ultimate retraction.
There are two additional shortcomings, however, that arise out
of the slightly insular nature of the book’s focus. Broadly stated,
Professor Gordon’s narrative does not address any connection that
the Mormon polygamy controversy might have with contemporary
concerns in the current political life of the United States. More
specifically, there are at least two significant issues in modern
American political and legal life to which the historical question of
Mormon polygamy might well be relevant. Professor Gordon steers
substantially clear of both of them.
The first of these is the current controversy over same-sex
marriage. This dispute is now being argued in courtrooms and
state legislatures all over the country, and has many of the same
emotional, moral, sexual and political connotations that the
Mormon polygamy dispute engendered. It is somewhat remarkable
that a book about Mormon polygamy published in 2002 has no
substantive discussion of these parallels, or the same-sex marriage
22
issue at all.
The second is the residual controversy over renegade Mormon
polygamy itself. Disaffected bands of religious families who
consider themselves Mormons are continuing to practice polygamy
in Utah and surrounding states. They are not part of the
mainstream Mormon church, and are in fact disavowed by the
church.
Occasionally news reports surface regarding young women
who “escape” from these polygamist households, and such stories
23
cause consternation. However, the consternation is usually based
22. Gordon includes a small handful of brief mentions of same-sex marriage.
GORDON, supra note 1 at 233, 234, 237. These are fairly summary references,
however, and appear in the final five pages of the narrative.
23. See, e.g., Michael Janofsky, Young Brides Stir New Outcry on Utah Polygamy,
N.Y. TIMES, February 28, 2003, at A1 (detailing the case of Lu Ann Kingston, who
was assertedly married at age 15 and left her polygamous household with a police
escort five years later). During March 2003, a particularly harrowing set of facts
was disclosed in the national press regarding the abduction of a 15-year-old Salt
Lake City girl. She was assertedly taken from her family’s home at night be a
crazed vagrant who made his way into the house by cutting through a window
screen. Nick Madigan, Kidnap Suspect is Cited in Plan for Eight Wives, N.Y. TIMES,
March 15, 2003, at A1, A13. The alleged abductor and his wife kept the child for
nine months, before they were apprehended and the child was returned to her
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on the age of these young women, and centers on ideas of child
protection against abuse. From reading the news reports, one gets
the idea that the concerns might be different, and less intense, if
the complaining women were in their late twenties or early thirties.
In the modern U.S. jurisprudential world, a household
composed of mutually-consenting adults engaged in private, nonviolent and non-commercial sexual relations as part of an
established pattern of family life might receive a more favorable
reception than it did in the mid-19th century. This is in substantial
part because in the last thirty-five years the Supreme Court has
developed a constitutional right to privacy concerning matters of
marriage, procreation and family life.
If the practice of Mormon polygamy in the 19th century were
judged against the privacy line of cases that are authoritative today,
Mormon polygamy might have fared somewhat better in popular
perceptions, and even in the courts. And, indeed, it is conceivable
that at some point in the future a modern renegade Mormon
polygamous family might successfully challenge state polygamy laws
on the basis of the federal right to constitutional privacy. Gordon
makes no substantial mention of the modern constitutional right to
privacy or its potential application in this context.
The remainder of this Review will focus primarily on
developing the first of these extrinsic comparisons, that having to
do with same-sex marriage. However, at the end of the discussion it
will become apparent that many of the ideas that have been
generated in this connection relate also to the issue of modern
polygamy. It is hoped that a connecting thread will be discerned
between these two extrinsic points, and that a degree of coherence
and rationality can be observed as a result of the impassioned and
dedicated labors of so many people for so many years.
III. TWO DISTINCT EPOCHS
Contrasting the 19th century Mormon polygamy debate with
family. The wife of the accused perpetrator asserted in press reports that the girl
had been taken to serve as the first of her husband’s next eight wives. The man
involved claimed to be following in the line of the Mormon prophets. However, it
seems clear that, assuming the truth of the allegations, the couple involved was
psychologically deranged. It would be unfair to regard their behavior as
representative or characteristic of all modern polygamists claiming to be
Mormons. Modern polygamous unions most often take place with the consent
and wish of the families involved; violent abductions and kidnappings from family
homes are not characteristic of the practice.
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the current debate about same-sex marriage makes one aware of
the different historical epochs in which these debates were carried
out. The differing epochs might be defined in the following terms.
The first epoch was that inhabited by the Latter-Day Saints, as
described in part by Professor Gordon. It would have begun at
least by 1843 with Joseph Smith’s receipt of the “Revelation on
24
Celestial Marriage,” continuing through the public proclamation
of that imperative in 1852 , continuing with the Reynolds decision in
1862, and ending (as Gordon might see it) with the decision in the
Late Corp. case.
The epoch inhabited by the advocates of same-sex marriage
would be seen as beginning in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s, with
state cases such as the Minnesota Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in
25
Baker v. Nelson, denying a marriage license to a same-sex couple.
It would continue through the issuance of more sympathetic state26
27
court cases, such as Baehr v. Lewin and Baker v. State, the first state
high-court decisions finding favorably for the prospect of same-sex
marriage. It would also pass through the DOMA movement, in
which many state governments, and the federal government, passed
28
legislation in the mold of “Defense of Marriage Acts.” Then, it
would end at some undetermined point in the future, when the
same-sex marriage controversy is resolved.
An explicit comparison between the Mormon attempts to
preserve polygamy and modern attempts to establish recognition
for same-sex marriage may strike some readers as far-fetched, and
perhaps insensitive to those sympathetic with the Mormon cause. It
is true that there are significant differences between the
circumstances of Mormon polygamy in the 19th century and those
of the modern activists for same-sex marriage, and some of these
will be discussed below. However, there are also many similarities.
The first and most direct similarity is that the Mormon
polygamists, like the modern activists, were espousing a form of
sexual union that was non-conformist, and involved sexual
practices that, at least among those of European ancestry in North
America, were innovative. It is true that there were examples of
24. Professor Gordon adds that “[r]umors at the time, and evidence of
experimentation disclosed by subsequent research, date the practice considerably
earlier than 1843 . . ..” GORDON, supra note 1, at 22.
25. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
26. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
27. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
28. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (the Federal “DOMA”).
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polygamy in other cultures, and in Biblical texts. But, the practice
of more or less open polygamy among Anglo-European settlers on
this continent was something new. Similarly, the open assertion
that same-sex couples should be permitted to marry legally is
characteristic of a non-conformist approach to sexual behavior and,
upon adoption, would amount to an innovation in the relationship
of law and sexuality.
Related to this similarity, but distinct from it, is the observation
that, beyond the sexual aspect of polygamous relations, the early
Mormons were taking a different view from society of what could
constitute the legally-sanctioned structure of a marriage. Whereas
prior to their arrival on the scene, marriage in the United States
was viewed virtually universally as the union of one man and one
woman, most Mormons during the relevant period viewed marriage
also as something that could take place between one man and two
or more women. Their view amounted to a re-definition of the
structure of marriage. This, of course, could also be said of
modern advocates of same-sex marriage.
Another area of similarity concerns the passionate hostility that
both sets of non-conformists have met. As noted earlier, Professor
Gordon’s narrative includes descriptions of the hostility, including
armed violence, with which early Mormons were met in the
29
Midwest. Her recounting also contains substantial descriptions of
the popular literature of the time, chiefly novels, which expressed
the most vituperative moral condemnation against Mormon
polygamy and the Mormons themselves. A veritable stable of
woman authors of the late 19th century seem to have made careers
out of publishing pulp novels excoriating Mormon polygamy and
30
the Mormon faith in general. These works appear to have been
taken seriously, and Professor Gordon’s work tends to indicate that
much serious political and public discourse was in the same vein.
Similarly, of course, the modern cause of same-sex marriage
has been roundly condemned on moral grounds. The success of
the DOMA legislation in various states and the federal Congress
and the vigorous denunciations that accompanied activism in

29. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the reception of the
early Mormons in some Midwestern states and the murder of Joseph Smith).
30. Professor Gordon highlights in particular the work of four female
novelists: M ETTA VICTOR, M ORMON WIVES (1856), M ARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE AMONG
THE M ORMONS (1855); ORVILLA B ELISLE , MORMONISM UNVEILED (1855); and
ALFREDA EVA BELL , BOADICEA (1855). GORDON, supra note 1, at 29-32.
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Hawaii and Vermont when the supreme courts of those states ruled
favorably regarding same-sex unions are merely some of the most
concrete examples. Indeed, of course, one of the ironies in this
area is that the modern Mormon church has been one of the most
dedicated opponents to the cause of same-sex marriage in both of
31
these states.
Perhaps most tellingly, both sets of non-conformists were
viewed by many of their antagonists solely in sexual terms. The
19th century critics of Mormon polygamy included many who
lumped the Mormons in with Fanny Wright, and other
32
contemporary promoters of “free love.” They assumed that
because many Mormon men engaged in polygamy, the men were
motivated primarily by licentiousness and a libidinous desire for
33
multiple sexual partners. It seems far more likely that most
polygamous husbands among the 19th century Mormons
approached polygamous relations with a strong sense of duty and
responsibility, and that common sexual avarice would have been
quite remote from their dominant motivations.
Similarly, opponents of same-sex marriage tend to essentialize
the gay men and lesbians who would be the most common
participants in such marriages according to sexual behavior. One
can form the impression that some critics of same-sex marriage
believe that the only thing a married same-sex couple would ever
do together would be to have sex, and that the only reason that
legal sanction is desired is to validate homosexual relations. Once
again, it is more likely that most same-sex couples approach their
unions with a sense of duty and responsibility. They want the
benefits of marriage to promote the security and stability of their

31. Professor Gordon acknowledges as much during her brief references to
the same-sex marriage issue. GORDON, supra note 1, at 234 (“The abiding sense of
pain and persecution that many Mormons bring to the study of their past does
not . . . make them sympathetic to others’ arguments for reshaping the structure
of marriage. In response to the gay marriage movement, for example, the church
strongly supported the federal Defense of Marriage Act . . ..”); GORDON, supra note
1, at 237 (“Mormon leaders are now commonly known as vocal opponents of
polygamy, feminism and gay rights.”).
32. Professor Gordon recounts that Fanny Wright was known as the “Red
Harlot of Infidelity” for her philosophy of “free love.” GORDON, supra note 1, at
38. She notes that at least one influential contemporary writer alluded to Wright’s
doctrines when attacking Mormon polygamy. Id. at 43.
33. GORDON, supra note 1, at 37 (“Exploring the sensual excesses of
dissidents, sensational writers and lecturers satisfied the urge to probe and expose
the sexual consequences of religious lapse.”).
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relations with each other and their children, quite the opposite of a
desire to facilitate irresponsibility.
Furthermore, both sets of non-conformists, although the basis
of their non-conformity is rooted in an area of legal responsibility
allocated to state governments (marriage and family life), have
been the subject of oppressive legislation at the federal level. The
early Mormons were plagued with the Morrill Act and the
34
Edmunds-Tucker Act, as noted above. The modern advocates of
same-sex marriage have been saddled with DOMA’s, not only in
35
numerous state jurisdictions, but in the federal Congress as well.
In all cases, the federal legislation was meant, not merely to
obstruct the disfavored practices, but to obliterate them as
completely as it was felt the restrictions of federalism would permit.
Finally, the reception of the Supreme Court to practitioners of
these kinds of non-conformity (until recently in the case of the
modern activists) has been fairly contemptuous. Professor
Gordon’s narrative demonstrates that the Mormons received
callously unfavorable treatment from the Court in the two cases on
36
which she concentrates: Reynolds v. United States and Late Corp. of
37
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States.
Similarly, the callous reception of gay men and lesbians in the case
38
of Bowers v. Hardwick has long been evident. (Only recently, with
39
the Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, has the Court’s attitude
been less dismissive, and that development is somewhat
34. See supra notes 5 & 19 and accompanying text respectively (briefly
describing the effects of the legislation).
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (referencing the state and
federal DOMAs as an element of the modern Epoch describing the progress of the
cause of same-sex marriage).
36. Professor Gordon seems at least mildly exasperated that in the Reynolds
decision the Court virtually ignored the arguments of the Mormons’ attorneys,
which were based on the limited scope of federal jurisdiction, and focused instead
on the extent of the Religion Clauses. She notes that the “carefully crafted. . .
arguments of the Mormons evaporated in Chief Justice Waite’s analysis for the
Court.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 130. She maintains that the Court’s treatment
of the Mormons’ argument “misconstrued” their “central constitutional claim.”
Id. at 132.
37. Regarding the Late Corporation case, Professor Gordon seems justifiably
skeptical of the Court’s reliance on the doctrine of “cy pres”, citing the checkered
history of the doctrine’s application. GORDON, supra note 1, at 216. She also
reports with some apparent sympathy the view of the dissenting justices, who
believed that cy pres should be a solely judicial remedy, rather than a basis for
Congressional enactment through the Edmunds-Tucker Act. Id. at 218.
38. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
39. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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counterbalanced by Justice Scalia’s fire-breathing dissent in the
case.)
On the other hand, it is true that there are significant
differences between the two sets of non-conformists. First and
foremost, the Mormon non-conformists were motivated by the
dictates of a formal organized religion. The modern nonconformists do not operate from a common religious base,
although some religious groups have evinced substantial support
for their cause. It is also true that the desire for legal sanction for
one’s deepest personal commitment strikes chords of spirituality
and inner meaning that can be religious in character. However, it
must be conceded that these dimensions of spirituality and
meaning are not the same social phenomenon as a formal
organized religion.
A major historical distinction would also be that the early
polygamous Mormons inhabited an area of territory that was
substantially geographically segregated. The modern activists for
same-sex marriage are to be found virtually everywhere, in most
every state in the union, in rural and urban communities alike.
This factor was material in that geographic isolation helped
concentrate the 19th century Mormon community and strengthen
its ability to resist hostile government and judicial action. While
modern gay and lesbian couples do lead lives together, raise
children, and in other respects behave as though they were
married, they do not have a broad expanse of isolated territory to
inhabit in which their alternative family structures could solidify
across a large and insular society.

40. 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia incredulously
exclaims near the beginning of his dissent that the Court’s opinion “places the
prestige of this institution behind the proposition that opposition to
homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.” Id. He later seems to
criticize the Court for favoring “special treatment for homosexuals.” Id. at 638.
He maintains that the Court’s perception of the Colorado constitutional
amendment there at issue to be “gay-bashing” is “so false as to be comical.” Id. at
645. It is especially ironic in the context of this Review that Justice Scalia also
attached substantial weight to the case of Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), in
which the Court upheld a “test oath” requirement imposed by the Idaho territorial
legislature, intended to exclude polygamous Mormons from voting. See also
GORDON, supra note 1, at 225-28 (discussing Davis in terms that clearly illustrate
the intolerance and hostility toward polygamous Mormons evident at the time).
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IV. CONTRASTING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE OF THE TWO EPOCHS
In addition to the factual and experiential distinctions
described above, the rhetorical dynamics regarding the U.S.
Constitution have differed substantially between the two Epochs.
Although their causes were structurally similar, partisans on each
side of the debate in each Epoch had different views of the Federal
Constitution and federal power than partisans of that “side” in the
other Epoch.
One such distinction involved the textual scope of the
Constitution as viewed by defenders of convention. Influential
defenders of sexual convention during the Epoch of Mormon
polygamy discerned in the text of the Constitution a particularized
41
notion of marriage that was hostile to the non-conformists.
According to Professor Gordon’s account, the need for this
approach was occasioned in part by the fact of Mormon hegemony
over the Western territories the Mormons occupied. Since a
certain degree of local autonomy needed to be conceded to the
territorial residents, opponents of polygamy needed to find a basis
in the Federal Constitution for denying the territorial residents
their freedom on this point. The assertion was that inherent in the
Federal Constitution was the idea of the family as a fundamental
bulwark of political society, and that our Federal Constitution was
conceived in and built on a particular, monogamous idea of the
family. Any state or territory that deviated from this norm would be
42
behaving in a way antithetical to the Constitution.
By contrast, many defenders of sexual convention during the
modern Epoch are required to perceive the Constitution as being
41. Professor Gordon describes the position of the novelist Metta Victor.
“The welfare of the country, claimed Victor, depended on Christian monogamy
and its attendant protection of women in marriage. The Constitution, she argued,
was infused with the Christian faith of its founders.” GORDON, supra note 1, at 30.
Professor Gordon also explains, more generally: “The moral compass of the state,
as anti-polygamist novelists described it, rested on the private relations of husband
and wife. . . .” Id. at 31. Professor Gordon also summarizes: “Metta Victor and
other early anti-polygamists relied on the national Constitution to shield them
from the power of latter-day revelation and practice.” Id.
42. See GORDON, supra note 1, at 65 (“Utah’s status as a territory provided the
opportunity to explore and expand federal power, because territories were
technically subject to federal control. And yet everybody knew that domestic
relations were matters of local constitutional practice. . . . Republicans cast around
for suitable theories to justify intervention.”). See also supra note 41 (describing
the connection in the view of some anti-polygamists between conventional
morality and precepts of the Federal Constitution).
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morally neutral on questions of marriage, procreation and family
43
life. That is because the line of privacy-rights cases created a
jurisprudence that already establishes a dimension of individual
rights in this area. Modern defenders of sexual convention tend to
disapprove of the privacy line of cases. They tend to argue that the
Constitution does not by its terms contain a substantive protection
of procreational privacy, and that therefore the Constitution must
be viewed as neutral on the subject. Accordingly, this preserves the
field of private relations in each state to its legislature, and the
privacy line of cases was largely (if not totally) in their view wrongly
decided. However, in taking this approach, modern defenders of
sexual convention are using an approach essentially opposite to
that used against the 19th century Mormons.
Another contrast in preferred Constitutional doctrine between
these Epochs is the “flip side” of the first contrast described above.
This contrast involved the proper role of federalism. The advocates
of the early Mormon non-conformists viewed the Federal
Constitution as a force that should allow for substantial state and
territorial autonomy. That is, in their view the Constitution rightly
would remain neutral in areas of marriage and allow the Western
territories in which the Mormons lived to adopt for themselves
their own legal structures regarding marriage and family life.
The non-conformists of the modern Epoch, on the other
hand, tend to use the Federal Constitution as a “sword,” rather
than a “shield.” They view that document as a tool with which to
advance their conception of individual rights. From their
perspective, the values of the Constitution are anything but neutral
on questions of marriage and family life.
Part of the explanation for this difference is traceable to the
control that the 19th century Mormons had over their Western
territories. Since they had effective control over this land area, they
43. The modern privacy line of cases began, of course, with Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), invalidating a state statute that prohibited the use
of certain contraceptives as violative of “a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights” that protected the marital decision to use contraceptives. 381 U.S. at 486.
The applicability of the right of privacy to other situations involving contraceptives
was extended in cases such as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) and Carey v.
Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). It was also extended to decisions
regarding abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). An early opinion that
serves as a precursor to this line of cases was Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), in which the Court asserted that “Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race,” and characterized this
interest as “one of the basic civil rights of man.” 316 U.S. at 541.
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were in a position to assert the virtues of a federalism that left
authority over marriage and family life with states or local
governments. The activists of the later Epoch, having no
geographic localization, are not able to use that argument.
The primary part of the explanation for this contrast in
Constitutional perspective is the intervening development of the
privacy-rights doctrine itself. It is because the modern Supreme
Court has developed the privacy line of cases that the nonconformists of the two Epochs have such divergent views of the
values of the Constitution. The modern non-conformists tend to
view the Constitution as a safeguard of individual liberty because
the Court has established that a right to privacy protects individual
choices regarding marriage, procreation and family life.
The Mormon non-conformists of the earlier Epoch did not
experience a Constitution interpreted by this line of cases, so they
were not able to use the document as a positive enforcer of
individual liberty in the area of marital and family privacy. They
instead could assert that then-dominant notions of federalism
should keep the federal government out of local decisions about
marriage and family. They could perceive the value of the
Constitution in this respect as being largely a bulwark against
federal involvement.
V. A POSSIBLE THREAD CONNECTING TWO EPOCHS
If the privacy line of cases is the primary basis for this
difference in favored Constitutional doctrines, how might the
arguments of the earlier Mormons have changed if the privacy line
of cases had been decided during, or prior to, their Epoch? This is
something we cannot know, given the mutual interdependence of
historical and cultural events. However, a far more concrete
question might well be, given the privacy line of cases, at some
point could a group of modern renegade Mormons assert the
privacy line of cases against a state prosecution under bigamy or
polygamy statutes? These cases have been decided during their
era, and are completely available to them, unlike the 19th century
Mormons.
Initially, the question may strike some as fanciful. It is not
unusual, for example, for Supreme Court justices to use polygamy
or bigamy statutes as examples of still-permissible state regulations
of marriage when discussing the modern privacy right. However,
no Supreme Court decision since the privacy line was developed
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has squarely held that statutes against polygamy are necessarily
valid as against a privacy challenge.
There is of course the adverse precedent in Reynolds v. United
44
States. However, the Reynolds decision held only that Mormon
polygamy was not protected by the First Amendment Free Exercise
Clause. That issue might even be viewed today as having been
correctly decided, in light of the modern Court’s holding in
45
Employment Division v. Smith. Assuming that the Morrill Act’s terms
were neutral and generally applicable, there might well be a strong
argument even today that such a federal statute should survive a
Free-Exercise challenge, at least as long as Employment Division v.
Smith remains the law.
However, the mere possibility that the Free-Exercise analysis in
Reynolds arrived at a correct result does not mean that the same
result should be reached if the same facts are analyzed on the basis
of the Due-Process right to privacy. The hypothetical modern
renegade group of polygamous Mormons would not succeed under
a Free-Exercise challenge to the enforcement of a bigamy statute
against them. This does not necessarily mean they would, or
should, be unsuccessful with a 14th Amendment Due Process
argument.
If the privacy line of cases was correctly decided, it must be
because there is something basic and fundamentally important
about the individual’s autonomy over his or her familial
relationships. The State cannot generally decide for a person
whether to have children, whether to maintain or curtail fertility or
virility, and what kinds of extended family relationships can
constitute a household. This fundamental interest in autonomy is
something that is constant, as true for one Epoch as for another.
To be sure, social and political circumstances may change and be
very different from one period to another. Perhaps considerations
of social stability prevent the individual’s interest in autonomy from
being completely free during certain epochs, but that does not
mean that the interest in freedom is less strong.
It certainly appears that certain state governments are
acknowledging expanded applications of the individual’s right to
make his or her own choices in the areas of marriage, procreation
and family life. In some cases, there is and no doubt will be, legal

44.
45.

98 U.S. 145 (1878).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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recognition of the right of a person to marry, or effectively marry,
another person of the same sex.
This is to some degree a revolutionary development, given the
hostility in governmental circles that would until recently, and in
some cases still, greets the idea of serious same-sex relationships.
But at least some states have acknowledged, and more will, the
basic human need to live in marital and family structures that are
meaningful and fulfilling to those who inhabit them. This is
beginning to be accepted now for those in same-sex relationships.
It was not accepted in the 19th century for the early Mormons.
This may have been because the dominant political and social
visions of the time could not conceive of countenancing their
structures without threatening the larger society.
However, there are now states and localities wherein large
numbers of adult gay men and lesbians are living openly as marital
or quasi-marital couples with families, and these states and localities
are continuing to thrive. Their example may, and perhaps should,
cause a re-examination of the extent to which plural marriage
among adults actually does threaten civil society. The tenacity of
that institution over time may speak to the sincerity and personal
commitment in which it is rooted, at least in the hearts of many.
While the basis for choosing this familial structure can be
grounded in religion, it is by no means necessary for one’s idea of
one’s own family to be religiously based in order for that idea to be
of fundamental importance in defining one’s own life.
Professor Gordon’s narrative leaves no doubt as to the sincerity
and commitment of the early Mormon practitioners of polygamy.
It is difficult to read Professor Gordon’s account without
experiencing some degree of sympathy for the Mormon population
that was so pervasively the object of scorn and condemnation from
much of the rest of the country. After all, this was a population
that had deep convictions about their relationships with one
another and their God, and most today would not doubt their
sincerity or integrity in attempting to live their ideals. If the
societal restrictions of their time forbade their living according to
their chosen precepts, perhaps as those restrictions change
character, those choosing potentially analogous precepts can be
accorded a more welcoming treatment in the future.
The thread of respect for individual autonomy in defining
one’s marital and family relationships seems to be extending into
new areas in the modern American legal landscape. A perspective

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003

17

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 9
BOOK _R EVIEW_WINER _F ORMATTED

1536

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

3/28/2003 12:00 AM

[Vol. 29:4

of understanding could well ensue for practitioners of a form of
plural marriage as a result of this development, providing that
others can view them with a sympathetic perspective. It is the
sympathy that one can experience for the early Saints from reading
Professor Gordon’s book that may be one of its most significant
values.
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